Quinean double standard see below which is divided into: Roderick ChisholmG. AnscombePeter Geachand Charles Taylor all adhere to the former position, namely that intentional idiom is problematic and cannot be integrated with the natural sciences.
Background and General Considerations Franz Brentano — is generally credited with having inspired renewed interest in the idea of intentionality, especially in his lectures and in his book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. In this work Brentano is, among other things, concerned to identify the proper sphere or subject matter of psychology.
While every such mental phenomenon has an Intentionality thesis, different mental phenomena relate to their objects in different ways depending on whether they are mental acts of presenting something, of judging about something, or of evaluating something as good or bad.
Identifying intentionality as the mark of the mental in this way opens up the possibility of studying the mind in terms of its relatedness to objects, the different modes or forms that this relatedness takes perceiving, imagining, hallucinating, and so forthand in terms of the relationships that these different modes of intentionality bear to one another the relationships between presentations, judgments, and evaluations; for example, that every judgment fundamentally depends on a presentation the object of which it is a judgment about.
Husserl studied with Brentano from to and, along with others such as Alexius Meinong, Kasimir Twardowski, and Carl Stumpf, took away from this experience an abiding interest in the analysis of the intentionality of mind as a key to the clarification of other issues in philosophy.
This latter being a Intentionality thesis of saying that Jack directed his mind toward the bird by thinking of it or perceiving it as a blue jay.
Husserl himself analyzes intentionality in terms of three central ideas: The intentional act or psychological mode of a thought is the particular kind of mental event that is, whether this be perceiving, believing, evaluating, remembering, or something else.
The intentional act can be distinguished from its object, which is the topic, thing, or state of affairs that the act is about. So the intentional state of seeing a white dog can be analyzed in terms of its intentional act, visually perceiving, and in terms of its intentional object, a white dog.
Intentional act and intentional object are distinct since it is possible for the same kind of intentional act to be directed at different objects perceiving a tree vs.
At the same time the two notions are correlative. For any intentional mental event it would make no sense to speak of it as involving an act without an intentional object any more than it would to say that the event involved an intentional object but no act or way of attending to that object no intentional act.
Intentional Content The third element of the structure of intentionality identified by Husserl is the intentional content. The basic idea, however, can be stated without too much difficulty. The intentional content of an intentional event is the way in which the subject thinks about or presents to herself the intentional object.
The idea here is that a subject does not just think about an intentional object simpliciter; rather the subject always thinks of the object or experiences it from a certain perspective and as being a certain way or as being a certain kind of thing.
Intentional content can be thought of along the lines of a description or set of information that the subject takes to characterize or be applicable to the intentional objects of her thought. Thus, in thinking that there is a red apple in the kitchen the subject entertains a certain presentation of her kitchen and of the apple that she takes to be in it and it is in virtue of this that she succeeds in directing her thought towards these things rather than something else or nothing at all.
It is important to note, however, that for Husserl intentional content is not essentially linguistic. While intentional content always involves presenting an object in one way rather than another, Husserl maintained that the most basic kinds of intentionality, including perceptual intentionality, are not essentially linguistic.
Indeed, for Husserl, meaningful use of language is itself to be analyzed in terms of more fundamental underlying intentional states this can be seen, for example, throughout LI, I.
The distinction between intentional object and intentional content can be clarified based on consideration of puzzles from the philosophy of language, such as the puzzle of informative identity statements.Edmund Husserl: Intentionality and Intentional Content.
Edmund Husserl (—) was an influential thinker of the first half of the twentieth century. Physicalism is the thesis that everything is physical, or as contemporary philosophers sometimes put it, that everything supervenes on the physical. the international journal of computer game research: volume 4, issue 1 November home: about: archive: Zach Whalen is a PhD student at the University of Florida.
His current writing and research includes work on video game genre theory, comics studies, House of Leaves, and digital pedagogy.
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The Mechanical Mind How can the human mind represent the external world?
What is thought, and can it be studied scientiﬁ cally? Does it help to think of.
Also see SEP on intentionality, intentions, and intentionality in ancient philosophy, and intentionality and consciousness, DPM, John Perry, Pär Sundström, and David L.
Thompson.. interactionism. The supposition, defended by Descartes and others, that the minds and bodies of human beings exert direct causal influence on each other, even though they are distinct substances of different kinds.